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Tell the tor client to only connect to. The corresponding NoOnionTrafficOnly flag is not supported. Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we have when making requests via this connection. Use with care! Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we have when making requests via this connection. When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that should get automapped according to AutomapHostsOnResolve , if we could return either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer an IPv4 answer.
Tor prefers IPv6 by default. Flags are processed left to right. If flags conflict, the last flag on the line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for conflicting flags. NUM must be between 1 and , inclusive. When Tor is out of bandwidth, on a connection or globally, it will wait up to this long before it tries to use that connection again. Note that bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes per second: this option only affects the frequency with which Tor checks to see whether previously exhausted connections may read again.
Default: msec. For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same exit node for each. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites that will expire all your authentication cookies i. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single user.
However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow. Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is seconds 30 minutes. Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Detailed information on how to configure pf to use divert-to rules can be found in the pf. When set along with UseBridges , Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors from the configured bridge authorities when feasible.
It will fall back to a direct request if the authority responds with a When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory guards. If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
In these cases, this option is ignored. This option specifies whether clients should use the guardfraction information found in the consensus during path selection. If UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard on our guard list before picking a new one.
If less than one day, we use defaults from the consensus directory. If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick NUM routers for our primary guard list, which is the set of routers we strongly prefer when connecting to the Tor network. Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information that Tor needs in order to build its circuits. Using microdescriptors makes Tor clients download less directory information, thus saving bandwidth.
For legacy reasons, auto is accepted, but it has the same effect as 1. Defaults: When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to " The default VirtualAddrNetwork address ranges on a properly configured machine will route to the loopback or link-local interface. The maximum number of bits for the network prefix is set to for IPv6 and 16 for IPv4.
However, a larger network that is, one with a smaller prefix length is preferable, since it reduces the chances for an attacker to guess the used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. The following options are useful for configuring timeouts related to building Tor circuits and using them:.
Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized from the specified value to twice that amount.
Default: 30 minutes; Max: 24 hours. Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used. Default: 60 seconds. If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a number like Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it.
Default: 2 minutes. Tor can enter dormant mode to conserve power and network bandwidth. The following options control when Tor enters and leaves dormant mode:. By default, Tor starts in active mode if it was active the last time it was shut down, and in dormant mode if it was dormant.
But if this option is true, Tor treats every startup event as user activity, and Tor will never start in Dormant mode, even if it has been unused for a long time on previous runs. Note: Packagers and application developers should change the value of this option only with great caution: it has the potential to create spurious traffic on the network. This option should only be used if Tor is started by an affirmative user activity like clicking on an application or running a command , and not if Tor is launched for some other reason for example, by a startup process, or by an application that launches itself on every login.
If Tor spends this much time without any client activity, enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and directory information is not fetched. Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes.
If true, then the first time Tor starts up with a fresh DataDirectory, it starts in dormant mode, and takes no actions until the user has made a request. This mode is recommended if installing a Tor client for a user who might not actually use it. If false, Tor bootstraps the first time it is started, whether it sees a user request or not.
After the first time Tor starts, it begins in dormant mode if it was dormant before, and not otherwise. If true, then any open client stream even one not reading or writing counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout.
If false, then only network activity counts. If false, then no amount of time without activity is sufficient to make Tor go dormant. Setting this option to zero is only recommended for special-purpose applications that need to use the Tor binary for something other than sending or receiving Tor traffic. The following options restrict the nodes that a tor client or onion service can use while building a circuit.
These options can weaken your anonymity by making your client behavior different from other Tor clients:. A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See ExcludeNodes for more information on how to specify nodes. A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit.
Country codes are 2-letter ISO codes, and must be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign. By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed to override in order to keep working. If you do not want this behavior, set the StrictNodes option documented below. Note also that if you are a relay, this and the other node selection options below only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. Clients can still build circuits through you to any node.
Controllers can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. Country codes are case-insensitive. A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit nodethat is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list too.
See also the caveats on the ExitNodes option below. A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address patterns of nodes to use as exit nodethat is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality.
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits such as those used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on that end at a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
If this option is set to 1 , then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes. A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits. This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order to discover your primary guard node.
Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop. Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this option. This is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points in the path. Hence it does not do load balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work. Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits. This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes. Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop. While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form:.
Hence it does not do load balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work. A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes to use for "middle" hops in your normal circuits. Middle hops are all hops other than exit and entry. This is an experimental feature that is meant to be used by researchers and developers to test new features in the Tor network safely.
Using it without care will strongly influence your anonymity. Other tor features may not work with MiddleNodes. This feature might get removed in the future. The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints, constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit.
This option can be used multiple times; each instance defines a separate family. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is necessary to perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a.
Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period using a given calculation rule see AccountingStart and AccountingRule. Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or received.
It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 TByte. When the number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period before waking up.
If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". Be careful: some internet service providers might count GBytes differently. How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached when we should hibernate during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate using the higher of either the sent or received bytes this is the default functionality.
Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes. Default: max. Specify how long accounting periods last. If month is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on the dayth day of one month to the same day and time of the next.
The relay will go at full speed, use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. The day must be between 1 and If week is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM of the dayth day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If day is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM each day to the same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in hour time.
Default: "month 1 ". The address of this server, or a fully qualified domain name of this server that resolves to an address. You can leave this unset, and Tor will try to guess your address. If set, this option disables IPv6 auto discovery. This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If this value is set to "auto", then Tor will look at AssumeReachable instead.
Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than to the public directory authorities. Note: make sure that no MyFamily lines are present in your torrc when relay is configured in bridge mode. If set along with BridgeRelay, Tor will include a new line in its bridge descriptor which indicates to the BridgeDB service how it would like its bridge address to be given out.
Default: any. Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so spammers might also collect them.
ContactInfo must be set to a working address if you run more than one relay or bridge. Really, everybody running a relay or bridge should set it. This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default, since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections more than it should. Set an exit policy for this server.
For example, "accept Tor also allows IPv6 exit policy entries. Using an IPv4 address with accept6 or reject6 is ignored and generates a warning. To specify all IPv4 and IPv6 internal and link-local networks including 0. Private addresses are rejected by default at the beginning of your exit policy , along with any configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. These private addresses are rejected unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0.
Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you want to use a reduced exit policy rather than the default exit policy, set "ReducedExitPolicy 1". If you want to replace the default exit policy with your custom exit policy, end your exit policy with either a reject : or an accept :.
Reject all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that the relay knows about, at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. This option is off by default, because it lists all public relay IP addresses in the ExitPolicy, even those relay operators might prefer not to disclose. Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option, or the default ExitPolicy if no other exit policy option is specified.
If at least one of these options is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 1. If none of these exit policy options are set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 0. When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost, RFC addresses, and so on. Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and pluggable transports configured on private addresses. Enabling this option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off. Log a heartbeat message every HeartbeatPeriod seconds.
This is a log level notice message, designed to let you know your Tor server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30 minutes. Default: 6 hours. If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 traffic. When this option is set and ExitRelay is auto, we act as if ExitRelay is 1. Store secret keys in DIR. Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.
If the option is "auto", then we use the setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the KeyDirectory is the same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. Log main loop statistics every HeartbeatPeriod seconds. Do not set this option too low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than this.
If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in this amount of time, reject new ones. This option can be repeated many times, for convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily lines are merged into one list. Do not list any bridge relay as it would compromise its concealment. If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay must list all other relays, as described above. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z].
If not set, Unnamed will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified by their identity fingerprints. How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other parallelizable operations. If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret key. Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
This option is required to be a Tor server. Set it to 0 to not run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as a relay.
You can choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its descriptors to any directories. Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all type s specified. The default is "1", which means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the appropriate authorities". The reduced exit policy is an alternative to the default exit policy.
It allows as many Internet services as possible while still blocking the majority of TCP ports. Currently, the policy allows approximately 65 ports. This reduces the odds that your node will be used for peer-to-peer applications. If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until it eventually succeeds.
When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames containing illegal characters like and : rather than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests usually to an advertising site. If they are, we will attempt to correct this. When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in filename. The file format is the same as the standard Unix " resolv. This option, like all other ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
Defaults to use the system DNS configuration or a localhost DNS service in case no nameservers are found in a given configuration. If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in "example. Default: "www. When this option is set, Tor will suggest IP : PORT as the listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch transport.
The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in path-to-binary using options as its command-line options, and expects to receive proxied client traffic from it. After NUM seconds, we exit. Default: 30 seconds. For how long should each Ed signing key be valid? Tor uses a permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically generates new "signing" keys that it uses online.
This option configures their lifetime. Default: 30 days. When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake, set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose some reasonable random defaults. Relays publish most statistics in a document called the extra-info document. The following options affect the different types of statistics that Tor relays collect and publish:. When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to it.
If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published as part of the extra-info document. Relays only. When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics about cell processing i. Onion router operators may use the statistics for performance monitoring. If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of the extra-info document.
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24 hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is being used as middle node in the circuit. Relays and bridges only.
When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. Enables relay and bridge operators to monitor how much their server is being used by clients to learn about Tor network. When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much inbound traffic that originates from Tor clients passes through their server to go further down the Tor network.
Exit relays only. When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. Enables exit relay operators to measure and monitor amounts of traffic that leaves Tor network through their exit node.
When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities. When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. When this option is enabled, a Tor relay will write an overload general line in the server descriptor if the relay is considered overloaded.
If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it can also put two more specific overload lines in the extra-info document if at least one of these conditions is met:. When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts. These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low.
This information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding. If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published as a part of the extra-info document. The following options are useful only for directory servers. Relays with enough bandwidth automatically become directory servers; see DirCache for details.
When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If DownloadExtraInfo is set, cached extra info documents are also cached. Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the directory ports.
The policies have the same form as exit policies above, except that port specifiers are ignored. If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port. This option can occur more than once, but only one advertised DirPort is supported: all but one DirPort must have the NoAdvertise flag set. As of Tor 0. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing to set up a separate webserver. When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate consensus diffs for any consensus older than this amount of time.
If this option is set to zero, Tor will pick a reasonable default from the current networkstatus document. You should not set this option unless your cache is severely low on disk space or CPU. If you need to set it, keeping it above 3 or 4 hours will help clients much more than setting it to zero.
The mitigations take place at relays, and are as follows:. In doubt, do not change those values. The following options are useful only for a public relay. They control the Denial of Service mitigation subsystem described above. Enable circuit creation DoS mitigation. If set to 1 enabled , tor will cache client IPs along with statistics in order to detect circuit DoS attacks. If an address is positively identified, tor will activate defenses against the address. This is a client to relay detection only.
If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0. The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit creation DoS. If not defined in the consensus, the value is The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for.
If not defined in the consensus, the value is seconds 1 hour. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 2. Minimum threshold of concurrent connections before a client address can be flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent connections, a detection is positive. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3. The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP address.
If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. Enable the connection DoS mitigation. If set to 1 enabled , for client address only, this allows tor to mitigate against large number of concurrent connections made by a single IP address. This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address for the connection mitigation. The possible values are:. The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address.
The allowed rate of client connection from a single address per second. If not defined or set to 0, it is controlled by a consensus parameter. The allowed burst of client connection from a single address per second. The base time period in seconds that the client connection defense is activated for. Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. The following options enable operation as a directory authority, and control how Tor behaves as a directory authority.
When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want to set this option. When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory , Tor accepts and serves server descriptors, but it caches and serves the main networkstatus documents rather than generating its own.
When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory , Tor generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in dir-spec. Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits is set. If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or more.
Default: KBytes. If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. Default: 2 MBytes. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this authority publishes. If set to 1, this directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.
The maximum number of servers that we will list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit". Default: 2. In all cases, Tor records every keypair it accepts in a journal if it is new, or if it differs from the most recently accepted pinning for one of the keys it contains. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed at all in any network status document that this authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted for publication by this authority.
If set, the directory authority will start rejecting directory requests from non relay connections by sending a error code if it is under bandwidth pressure reaching the configured limit if any. Relays will always tried to be answered even if this is on.
Switch for the shared random protocol. If non-zero default , the flag "shared-rand-participate" is added to the authority vote indicating participation in the protocol. If this option is set to 0, then we treat relays as "Running" if their RSA key is correct when we probe them, regardless of their Ed key. We should only ever set this option to 0 if there is some major bug in Ed link authentication that causes us to label all the relays as not Running.
If set to 1, then we periodically check every relay we know about to see whether it is running. If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used by the only partially implemented "bridge community" design, where a community of bridge relay operators all use an alternate bridge directory authority, and their target user audience can periodically fetch the list of available community bridges to stay up-to-date.
Default: not set. If set to 1, Tor will accept server descriptors with arbitrary "Address" elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP address, it will reject the server descriptor. Additionally, Tor will allow exit policies for private networks to fulfill Exit flag requirements.
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the guardfraction file which contains information about how long relays have been guards. Default: unset. A total value, in abstract bandwidth units, describing how much measured total bandwidth an authority should have observed on the network before it will treat advertised bandwidths as wholly unreliable.
Minimum uptime of a relay to be accepted as a hidden service directory by directory authorities. Default: 96 hours. This information is included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade.
This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. Configures the number of VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases directory traffic. Must be at least 2. If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a different identity.
This feature is used to migrate directory authority keys in the event of a compromise. Default: 1 hour. To avoid inconsistent reads, bandwidth data should be written to temporary file, then renamed to the configured filename. When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory.
Each version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities provide this service optionally. The following options are used to configure a hidden service. Some options apply per service and some apply for the whole tor instance. The next section describes the per service options that can only be set after the HiddenServiceDir directive.
If set to 1, then connections to unrecognized ports do not cause the current hidden service to close rendezvous circuits. Setting this to 0 is not an authorization mechanism; it is instead meant to be a mild inconvenience to port-scanners. Every hidden service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to specify multiple services.
Please note that you cannot add new Onion Service to already running Tor instance if Sandbox is enabled. Do not rely on this behavior; it is not guaranteed to remain the same in future versions. If this option is set to 1, allow the filesystem group to read the hidden service directory and hostname file. If the option is set to 0, only owner is able to read the hidden service directory. Default: 0 Has no effect on Windows. Enable DoS defense at the intropoint level. When this is enabled, the rate and burst parameter see below will be sent to the intro point which will then use them to apply rate limiting for introduction request to this service.
The introduction point honors the consensus parameters except if this is specifically set by the service operator using this option. The service never looks at the consensus parameters in order to enable or disable this defense. The allowed client introduction burst per second at the introduction point.
If this option is 0, it is considered infinite and thus if HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense is set, it then effectively disables the defenses. The allowed client introduction rate per second at the introduction point. The onion service will use the given protocol to expose the global circuit identifier of each inbound client circuit.
This option is only for v3 services. The haproxy option works in the following way: when the feature is enabled, the Tor process will write a header line when a client is connecting to the onion service. The header will look like this:. We encode the "global circuit identifier" as the last bits of the first IPv6 address. All other values in the header can safely be ignored.
In the case above, where the last bits are 0xffffffff, the global circuit identifier would be For more information about this see control-spec. If set to 1, this onion service becomes an OnionBalance instance and will accept client connections destined to an OnionBalance frontend. The maximum number of simultaneous streams connections per rendezvous circuit. The maximum value allowed is Setting this to 0 will allow an unlimited number of simultaneous streams. If set to 1, then exceeding HiddenServiceMaxStreams will cause the offending rendezvous circuit to be torn down, as opposed to stream creation requests that exceed the limit being silently ignored.
Number of introduction points the hidden service will have. You may use this option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent HiddenServiceDir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the same port on You may override the target port, address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, addr:port, or unix: path. You can specify an IPv6 target as [addr]:port. Unix paths may be quoted, and may use standard C escapes. Note that address-port pairs have to be comma-separated.
A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden service. Currently, only version 3 is supported. Experimental - Non Anonymous Hidden Services on a tor instance in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop direct circuits between the onion service server, and the introduction and rendezvous points.
Onion service descriptors are still posted using 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service directories blocking the service. This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by a tor instance a Single Onion Service. One-hop circuits make Single Onion servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
However, the fact that a client is accessing a Single Onion rather than a Hidden Service may be statistically distinguishable. It is best practice to create a new hidden service directory, key, and address for each new Single Onion Service and Hidden Service. It is not possible to run Single Onion Services and Hidden Services from the same tor instance: they should be run on different servers with different IP addresses.
Makes hidden services non-anonymous on this tor instance. Enables direct connections in the server-side hidden service protocol. If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if non-default set of DirAuthorities is set.
Cannot be unset while Tor is running. After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. Default: 30 minutes. TestingAuthKeyLifetime N seconds minutes hours days weeks months. Default: 2 days. TestingAuthKeySlop N seconds minutes hours. Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they have just started, or when they can not contact any of their bridges.
Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download each bridge descriptor when they know that one or more of their configured bridges are running. Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download consensuses. Initial delay in seconds for when clients should download things in general.
When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has passed. A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address patterns of nodes to vote Exit for regardless of their uptime, bandwidth, or exit policy. In order for this option to have any effect, TestingTorNetwork has to be set. If True 1 , a node will never receive the Exit flag unless it is specified in the TestingDirAuthVoteExit list, regardless of its uptime, bandwidth, or exit policy.
A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and address patterns of nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their uptime and bandwidth. If True 1 , a node will never receive the Guard flag unless it is specified in the TestingDirAuthVoteGuard list, regardless of its uptime and bandwidth. A list of identity fingerprints and country codes and address patterns of nodes to vote HSDir for regardless of their uptime and DirPort. Let a directory connection stall this long before expiring it.
Overrides the default lifetime for the certificates used to authenticate our X link cert with our ed signing key. TestingLinkKeySlop N seconds minutes hours. Sets a lower-bound for assigning an exit flag when running as an authority on a testing network. Overrides the usual default lower bound of 4 KBytes.
Minimum value for the Fast flag. Overrides the ordinary minimum taken from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. Do not report our measurements for our maximum observed bandwidth for any time period that has lasted for less than this amount of time. Values over 1 day have no effect. Default: 1 day. Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download consensuses. Initial delay in seconds for when servers should download things in general. How early before the official expiration of a an Ed signing key do we replace it and issue a new key?
Default: 3 hours for link and auth; 1 day for signing. Like V3AuthDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Like V3AuthVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created.
Directory authorities offset voting start time by this much. Other options of this type are documented in control-spec. End-users should mostly ignore them. These underscore-prefixed options are variants of the regular Port options. The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.
The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration including closing and reopening logs , and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable. Contains downloaded directory key certificates that are used to verify authenticity of documents generated by the Tor directory authorities. These files contain the downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used.
Sign up to join this community. The best answers are voted up and rise to the top. Stack Overflow for Teams — Start collaborating and sharing organizational knowledge. Create a free Team Why Teams? Learn more. How do I launch Tor browser on specific web page from command line? Ask Question. Asked 4 years, 4 months ago. Modified 4 years, 4 months ago. Viewed 4k times. I need a script to open Tor browser at specific web site. Improve this question. Vitor Abella Vitor Abella 6, 12 12 gold badges 53 53 silver badges 95 95 bronze badges.
I think the command would be similar to firefox u. Add a comment. Sorted by: Reset to default. Highest score default Date modified newest first Date created oldest first. Improve this answer. What if the Tor Browser is already open? Then I get the error "Tor Browser is already running, but is not responding.
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